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1. Expression and the special force of blame 
One of the central philosophical questions about blame is how to account for ± and, if 
appropriate, justify ± its special force. Perhaps anyone who takes morality seriously and thinks of 
persons as in some way accountable to moral standards will have to make some sort of negative 
evaluation of agents who fail to meet those standards. But we can imagine a form of moral 
seriousness that would have no role for the special force of blame. For instance, an agent might 
UHVSRQGWRZURQJGRLQJZLWKDVLPSOHPRUDO³JUDGLQJ´RUDSSUDLVDO6XFKDSSUDLVDOPLJKWLQYROYH
recognising and appreciating the gravity of some moral failure (in some sense at least); and it 
might issue in behaviour such as taking such steps as are prudent to limit the bad consequences 
(for oneself or more generally) of that failure for the future. It might involve making judgements 
of persons and their behaviour as better or worse depending on how closely they adhered to 
moral standards. Alternatively, an agent might respond to moral wrongdoing by verbal moral 
criticism, communicating the judgement that what was done was wrong in such a way that the 
offender can grasp the force of the reasons neglected in his action, and take them into account in 
the future. But something of our common reactions to wrongdoing would be missing on these 
approaches. Blame involves us in a more intimate and charged relationship with a wrongdoer 
than does grading or moral criticism. The flavour of blame can be captured by seeing it as an 
DFFRPSDQLPHQWWRWKHTXHVWLRQ³+RZFRXOGKHVKH\RX,"´LWEULQJVWKHRIIHQGHU¶VDWWLWXGHV
vividly into our field of attention and concerns us with how the offender could possibly have 
been thinking (as she acted thus). And notoriously, blame often issues in some sort of 
³ZLWKGUDZDORIJRRGZLOO´IURPWKHRIIHQGHUDVDUHVXOWRIWKHRIIHQFH 
7KHLQIOXHQWLDO³UHDFWLYHDWWLWXGHV´DSSURDFKRI3)6WUDZVRQDQG5-D\:DOODFHVHHNVWR
account for the special force of blame by seeing blame as an essentially emotional response.1 
However, if we are interested in attempting to justify blame, the emotions may be false friends. 
Appeals to the emotions in normative matters raise the suspicion that an important justificatory 
burden is being evaded by brute psychological fact.2 If, on the other hand, we insist that 
emotions are not non-cognitive states, but that they (partly) consist in, or essentially depend on, 
judgements, we face the problem of explaining how, even if the judgement itself is appropriate 
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and true, that part of blame that exceeds the judgement (for instance, the way blame leads us to 
treat the offender) is to be justified. Why the charged atmosphere of blame rather than rational 
moral criticism? 
In this paper I am interested in an idea that might (mis)lead us into thinking that the force of 
blame has to be accounted for through the emotions ± QDPHO\WKHWKRXJKWWKDWEODPH¶VVSHFLDO
force is expressive. I will explore the idea that, in accounting for this force, we do not get to the 
bottom of the matter, normatively speaking, if we appeal to the emotions. Rather, I think, we 
have to begin with the observation that expressive behaviour is symbolic, and that expressive 
behaviour is not merely instinctual or non-cognitive but that it makes a claim to the adequacy of 
its symbolism.
3
 That way of putting it makes it clear that if, in seeking to justify blame, we are 
tempted to talk about its expressive nature, a justificatory burden is not being evaded. There are 
justifications to be offered, but they are justifications having to do with a) the need for a 
distinctively symbolic response, and b) the adequacy of a particular set of symbols. The crucial 
UHODWLRQRI³H[SUHVVLRQ´RQWKLVYLHZLVQRWDPHFKDQLFDORQHRQZKLFKEHKDYLRXULVSXVKHGRXW
of us by the force of internal emotional pressure; rather the symbolism responds to, and can seem 
to be required by, a way of understanding the normative demands of a situation.4 
In developing this line of thought I will contrast it with the view of blame developed by T. M. 
Scanlon.5 6FDQORQ¶VYLHZLVLQVRPHZD\VVLPLODUWRWKHYLHZ,ZLOOSURSRVH6 it also seeks to 
give a justifiable interpretation of the idea that blame is essentially bound up with an impairment 
of relations with the offender and a withdrawal from the offender that reflects that impairment.7 
But these apparent similarities mask some fundamental differences. I will argue that Scanlon is 
right to think that blameworthiness involves the impairment of the relationship it is possible to 
have with the agent blamed, where this impairment is brought about by the manifestation of 
some intolerable attitude to others (or, indeed, to the proper demands of whatever is of value). 
But I will argue that there are two importantly different ways of understandLQJ³LPSDLUPHQW´
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The relationship might EHLPSDLUHGEHFDXVHWKHSHUVRQ¶VLQWROHUDEOHDWWLWXGHVPDNHVWKHSHUVRQ
hard to trust, or hard to get on with. Or the relationship might be impaired because the person 
who takes seriously the values underpinning the UHODWLRQVKLSZRXOGH[SHULHQFHWKDWDJHQW¶V
intolerable attitudes as something it is necessary to dissociate herself from, so that it would 
appear a wrongful acquiescence in those attitudes to continue the relationship as normal. I will 
argue that the latter is the better way to understand impairment. However, I will argue that this is 
a line of thought that involves making the claim that the most adequate response to the situation 
is an expressive or symbolic one, and hence raises a question whether some normative reasons 
refer essentially to expressive or symbolic relations.  
2. Scanlon on blame, impairment of relationships and withdrawal 
&HQWUDOWR6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQWRIEODPHLVWKHLGHDWKDWZURQJGRLQJLPSDLUVWKHUHODWLRQVLWLV
possible to have with a wURQJGRHU³WRFODLPWKDWDSHUVRQLVEODPHZRUWK\IRUDQDFWLRQLVWR
FODLPWKDWWKHDFWLRQVKRZVVRPHWKLQJDERXWWKHDJHQW¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVRWKHUVWKDWLPSDLUVWKH
relations that others can have with him or her. To blame a person is to judge him or her to be 
blameworthy and to take your relationship with him or her to be modified in a way that this 
MXGJHPHQWRILPSDLUHGUHODWLRQVKROGVWREHDSSURSULDWH´SS-9). Thus wrongdoing takes 
place in the context of human relations: even though we might not actually have a relationship 
with the wrongdoer, he is someone with whom it is, other things being equal, possible to enter 
into a range of distinctively human interactions. Such relationships and interactions require 
certain sorts of mutual attitudes of respect and concern on the parts of their members. However, 
wrongdoing reveals that a person has attitudes that are incompatible with full membership of 
such relationships: the person does not give the appropriate importance to the standards of 
respect and concern that underpin that kind of relationship. As a result, the relations that one can 
have with that person are impaired. Scanlon illustrates his view with an example of friendship.  
³6XSSRVH,OHDUQWKDWDWDSDUW\ODVWZHHNVRPHDFTXDLQWDQFHVZHUHWDOking about me, and 
making some cruel jokes at my expense. I further learn that my close friend Joe was at 
the party, and that rather than coming to my defence or adopting a stony silence, he was 
laughing heartily and even contributed a few barbs, revealing some embarrassing facts 
about me that I had told him in confidence. This raises a question about my relationship 
with Joe. Should I still consider Joe to be my friend? This is not just a question about his 
future conduct ... The question is not just about how he will act in the future but about 
ZKDWKDSSHQHGLQWKHSDVWDQGZKDWLWLQGLFDWHVDERXW-RH¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGPHDQGDERXW
WKHQDWXUHRIRXUUHODWLRQVKLS´S 
As a result of what one now knows about Joe, one might consider whether his action could be 
interpreted in such a way that it is consistent with the basic demands of friendship. In this 
H[DPSOHLWVHHPVRQHPLJKWFRQFOXGHWKDWLWLVQRWVRFRQVLVWHQWDQGKHQFHRQHPLJKWDOWHURQH¶V
relationship with Joe, thinking of him and treating him differently as a result of his action and 
ZKDWLWVKRZVDERXWKLVDWWLWXGHWR\RX³,PLJKWIRUH[DPSOHFHDVHWRYDOXHVSHQGLQJWLPHZLWK
him in the way one does with a friend, and I might revise my intentions to confide in him and to 
 4 
encourage him to FRQILGHLQPH´SS-7KHQXERI6FDQORQ¶VYLHZLVWKDWWRMXGJHWKDWD
person has failed to govern himself consistently with the basic demands of the relationship, and 
that this makes it impossible for the relationship to continue on its previous terms, is to judge the 
person blameworthy; and that to blame someone is to reorient (or downgrade) the relationship in 
accordance with this judgement. 
6FDQORQ¶VFHQWUDOH[DPSOHRIEODPHWDNHVSODFHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIDQRQJRLQJUHODWLRQVKLS
characterised by shared interaction.8 But Scanlon argues that the same structure of blame can be 
DSSOLHGWRYLRODWLRQVRIWKHWHUPVRIZKDWKHFDOOVWKH³GHIDXOWPRUDOUHODWLRQVKLS´WKDWZHDUHDOO
in with one another simply by virtue of being rational human agents.  
³7Rjudge individuals to be blameworthy, I am claiming, is to judge that their conduct 
shows something about them that indicates this kind of impairment of their relations with 
others, an impairment that makes it appropriate for others to have attitudes toward them 
different from those that constitute the default moral relationship. To blame someone is 
DFWXDOO\WRKROGPRGLILHGDWWLWXGHVRIWKLVNLQGWRZDUGKLPRUKHU´S 
7KHGHIDXOWPRUDOUHODWLRQVKLSH[LVWVEHFDXVH³PRUDOLW\UHTXLUHVWKDWZHKROGFHUWain attitudes 
WRZDUGRQHDQRWKHUVLPSO\LQYLUWXHRIWKHIDFWWKDWZHVWDQGLQWKHUHODWLRQRIµIHOORZUDWLRQDO
EHLQJV¶´,WUHTXLUHVXVWRWDNHFDUHQRWWREHKDYHLQZD\VWKDWZLOOKDUPWKRVHWRZKRPZHVWDQG
in this relation, to help them when we can easily do so, not to lie to them or mislead them, and so 
RQS7KLVUHODWLRQVKLSLVRQHZHDUHLQZLWK³SHRSOHLQJHQHUDOQRWVLPSO\>ZLWK@VSHFLILF
LQGLYLGXDOVZKRPZHDUHDZDUHRIRUFRXOGVSHFLI\´S,WPD\EHRGGWRWDONRIEHLQJLQD
relationship with people one has never, and will never meet or have any interaction with. But the 
DQDORJ\LVVXIILFLHQWO\FORVHWRPDNHWKHVWUXFWXUHRIEODPHUHOHYDQWWRERWKEHFDXVH³ZKHQZH
do become aware of others and are in actual or potential interaction with them, we generally 
assume that even if they are strangers they will manifest at least the basic elements of this ideal 
FRQFHUQ´S 
The basic structure of blame that holds in the case of friendship also holds in the case of the 
moral relationshLSEXWDV6FDQORQQRWHVWKLVSRVHVDSUREOHPVLQFHKHEHOLHYHVWKDW³WKHEDVLF
forms of moral concern are not conditional on ... reciprocation. Even those who have no regard 
for the justifiability of their actions toward others retain their basic moral rights ± they still have 
claims on us not to be hurt or killed, to be helped when they are in dire need, and to have us 
KRQRUSURPLVHVZHKDYHPDGHWRWKHP´S7KXVZKLOHLWPD\EHDQRSWLRQLQWKHFDVHRI
friendship simply to end the relationship ± and that is precisely what blame might consist it ± no 
such thing is possible in the case of acts that undermine the moral relationship. So what can 
EODPHLQWKLVFDVHFRQVLVWLQ"6FDQORQ¶VDQVZHULVWKDWZHVKRXOGORRNDWWKDW³UDQJHRI
interactions with RWKHUVWKDWDUHPRUDOO\LPSRUWDQWEXWQRWRZHGXQFRQGLWLRQDOO\WRHYHU\RQH´S
143), such as our having a willingness to enter into agreements and other cooperative relations of 
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trust, to help when it will cost us little, and to hope that things will go well for the person. It is 
these things that may be suspended in moral blame.  
:K\FDQ¶WWKHUHODWLRQVKLSFRQWLQXHXQDIIHFWHGDIWHUZURQJGRLQJ" 
2QHRIWKHFUXFLDOPRYHVRQ6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQW± particularly in terms of the concerns of this 
paper ± comes in answering the question why, if we have concluded that a person has violated 
the basic terms of some relationship, we should therefore reorient or downgrade the relationship. 
6FDQORQDQVZHUVWKLVTXHVWLRQE\VD\LQJWKDWWKHDJHQW¶VRZQDWWLWXGHVKDYHLPSDLred the 
relationship: 
³,PSDLUPHQWRIWKHNLQG,UHIHUWRRFFXUVZKHQRQHSDUW\ZKLOHVWDQGLQJLQWKHUHOHYDQW
relation to another person, holds attitudes toward that person that are ruled out by the 
standards of that relationship, thus making it appropriate for the other party to have 
DWWLWXGHVRWKHUWKDQWKRVHWKDWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSQRUPDOO\LQYROYHV³S 
This way of putting it raises the question of what makes it appropriate for the wronged party to 
have attitudes that depart from those normal to that type of relationship. A similar question is 
UDLVHGE\VRPHRI6FDQORQ¶VRWKHUIRUPXODWLRQV 
³$WWKHH[WUHPH,PLJKWFRQFOXGHWKDW-RHZDVQRWUHDOO\DIULHQGDIWHUDOO7RFRQFOXGH
that this is so would be to conclude that I have reason to revise my expectations and 
intentions in certain ways: to decide not to rely on or confide in Joe as one would in the 
case of a friend, and not to seek his company, to find it reassuring, or to have the special 
concern for his feelings and well-being that one has for DIULHQG¶V7RUHYLVHP\
intentions and expectations ... in this way ... is to blame him ... [Alternatively,] the 
relationship can continue in an impaired form. If it does, there may be changes in the 
ways that the injured party has reasons to behave. For example, if I have been making fun 
of you behind your back, then you have reason to be less free in revealing yourself to me 
WKDQ\RXZRXOGQRUPDOO\EHZLWKDIULHQG´S 
7KLVSDVVDJHPDNHVWKHFODLPWKDWWKHLQMXUHGSDUW\³KDVUHDVRQWR´DEDQGRQRr downgrade the 
relationship, and that these reasons will be reasons to blame. What sorts of reasons are these? 
One possible answer that the passage above suggests is that the reasons to change the terms of 
the relationship are in the final analysis prudential: reasons of self-protection. This interpretation 
might give us an odd-sounding view, since it might seem unlikely that our reasons for blaming 
others are, at least in any direct way, self-interested reasons. However, this interpretation might 
be suppoUWHGE\6FDQORQ¶VFODLPWKDWLWZRXOGEHZHDNRUVHUYLOHRUGHPHDQLQJWRFRQWLQXHEHLQJ
good friends with someone who never treats one as friend himself. The person who fails to break 
 6 
with the abusive friend is someone who puts too little weight on their own value, and hence is 
SUHSDUHGWREHD³GRRUPDW´IRURWKHUVWRWUDPSOHRYHU9  
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGSHUKDSVDVWURQJHULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6FDQORQ¶VYLHZLVWKDWWKHUHDVRQVWKH
person has to revise their treatment of the (erstwhile) friend have rather to do with the standards 
of friendship themselves. After all, there are degrees of friendship, based on confidence, trust, 
distance, sharing; and one can change the terms of a friendship to reflect the fact that a person is 
simply not as close a friend to you as you had previously thought. Another way of putting this 
would be to say that you change the terms of the friendship because, on the basic of her actions, 
the person does not deserve to be treated as one of your close friends. This second interpretation 
tiHVLQZLWK6FDQORQ¶VRZQFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIKLVWKHRU\DVDW\SHRIGHVHUWWKHRU\ 
³0\DFFRXQWRIEODPHLVDGHVHUW-based view, in the sense in which I believe that term 
should be understood. That is to say, I take blame to consist of attitudes toward a person 
that are justified simply by attitudes of that person that make them appropriate, and I hold 
that there is no need to appeal to other justifications such as the beneficial consequences 
of blaming or the fact that the person could have avoided being subject t blame. Like 
UHIXVDOVRIIULHQGVKLSEODPHLVMXVWLILHGVLPSO\E\ZKDWDSHUVRQLVOLNH´S 
Scanlon offers us a desert theory, where desert means in this case: having the relationship with 
each that their attitudes fit them for. In this case, desert involves including a person in those 
relationships in which they are fit to participate. Scanlon effectively gives a justification for the 
retributive-sounding idea that one should ± or at least is permitted to ± treat others as they treat 
you, but the force of this reciprocity comes, not from an independent idea of desert, but from the 
relationships themselves. No one deserves to be treated as a friend who does not treat their 
friends as friends. 
We should briefly note at this point that there are in turn two ways of interpreting this claim 
about fittingness and desert. On the first interpretation, it is the thought that one should not have 
friendships with those who abuse you, not simply for self-interested reasons, but because such 
people are not the fitting objects of friendship: they have no claim on the deployment of your 
time and resources that is involved in friendship if they do not have the appropriate attitudes to 
\RXWKH\GRQ¶WGHVHUYH\RXUIULHQGVKLSOn the second interpretation, the thought is that the 
ZLWKGUDZDOLVILWWLQJUHJDUGOHVVRIDQ\ZLGHUTXHVWLRQVRIKRZWRVSHQGRQH¶VWLPHDQGUHVRXUFHV
WKHSRLQWLVUDWKHUWKDWWKHRWKHU¶VDWWLWXGHVPDNHWKDWGHJUHHRIIULHQGVKLSEHWZHHQWKHWZRRI
you impossible. Given that the relationVKLS³LVFRQVWLWXWHGE\FHUWDLQDWWLWXGHVDQGGLVSRVLWLRQV´
parties have to one another (p. 131), it follows that where one party changes their attitude the 
UHODWLRQVKLSFKDQJHV(YHQLI\RXDVWKHYLFWLPLJQRUHGWKHRWKHU¶VYLRODWLRQRIWKHWHUPVRIWKH 
relationship and continued to treat them as if nothing had happened, the friendship would not be 
                                                     
9
 -*0XUSK\³)RUJLYHQHVVDQG5HVHQWPHQW´LQ-*0XUSK\DQG-+DPSWRQForgiveness and Mercy 
&DPEULGJH&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV6HHDOVR3+LHURQ\PL³$UWLFXODWLQJDQ8QFRPSURPLVLQJ
)RUJLYHQHVV´Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001), pp. 529-555. 
 7 
what it was (or what you had mistakenly thought it was). Your actions in this case would be out 
of line with the nature of the relationship.  
,ZRQ¶WDWWHPSWGHILQLWLYHO\WRDGMXGLFDWHEHWZHHQWKHVHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI6FDQORQ¶V³GHVHUW´
theory of blame, except to ask what the significance of each is for the question of why we have 
reason to blame. The second interpretation has the advantage of restricting our reasons for 
withdrawal to considerations to do with the nature of the relationship, rather than invoking the 
wise use of time and resources. But, perhaps for that very reason, on this interpretation Scanlon 
lacks a good answer to the question of why I have strong reason to change my behaviour towards 
the offender. If I fail to withdraw from one who has abused me, my actions might be out of line 
with the relationship ± but is it a vice or a virtue to be more generous to a person than the 
relationship demands? If we have strong reason to blame then, other things being equal, there 
must be some failing in not blaming. It is not clear, that, on this second interpretation, Scanlon 
can explain what that failing is.  
3UREOHPVZLWK6FDQORQ¶VYLHZ 
Assuming, at any UDWHWKDWWKH³GHVHUW´DFFRXQWLQVRPHVKDSHLVWKHFRUUHFWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
6FDQORQ¶VYLHZWKHUHDUHDQXPEHURISUREOHPVZLWKLW)LUVWRIDOOLWLVQRWFOHDUWKDWWKHGHVHUW
theory can give him the conclusion that he wants. In the phrase I quoted above, Scanlon 
FKDUDFWHULVHVEODPHDVFRPLQJDERXWZKHQDSHUVRQ¶VDWWLWXGHVDUHVXFKWKDWLWLPSDLUVWKH
UHODWLRQVKLSRQH³FDQ´KDYHZLWKKHU,WLVWKLV³FDQQRW´WKDWLVPHDQWWRH[SODLQZK\UHODWLRQV
between the two parties have to change when such attitudes are manifested. The interpretation of 
WKLV³FDQQRW´WKDW,DPRIIHULQJLVWKDWRQ6FDQORQ¶VGHVHUWWKHRU\WKHSHUVRQ¶VDWWLWXGHVVKRZ
KHUWREHXQILWIRUIULHQGVKLS+RZHYHUFRQWUDU\WR6FDQORQEHLQJXQILWIRUIULHQGVKLSGRHVQ¶W
make it the case that one cannot seek to have a relationship of friendship with them. One may be 
unwise to; it may be pointless; one may be leaving oneself open to abuse; perhaps the 
UHODWLRQVKLSLVXQOLNHO\WREHVXFFHVVIXO%XWLVWKDWZKDWLVPHDQWE\³FDQQRW´",WZRXOGKave 
struck the wrong note if Scanlon had characterised blame as the revision of relationships that 
comes about when someone acts in a way that makes it inadvisable to continue to have the same 
relationship with her. Alternatively one might interpret ScanloQ¶VYLHZDVVD\LQJWKDWRQHLV
ZLWKLQRQH¶VULJKWV to revise the relationship, or that, given the level of her commitment, the 
other can have no justified complaint if one does so. However, this does not give us the 
conclusion that the relationship is impaired in the sense that one cannot continue as things were.  
$IXUWKHUUHVSRQVHWRWKHVHFRQFHUQVZRXOGEHWRWXUQWRWKHVHFRQGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³GHVHUW´WKDW
,RIIHUHGDERYH2QWKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ6FDQORQ¶VWKRXJKWLVWKDWEHFDXVHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSLV
constituted by the attitudes the parties can have towards one another, a certain degree of 
friendship cannot exist when one party has attitudes incompatible with that degree. And that 
ZRXOGVHHPWREHFRUUHFW+RZHYHUWKLV³FDQQRWKDYHWKDWGHJUHHRIUHODWLRQVKLS´LVPHDQWLQ
turn to explain why one cannot continue to treat the person as though nothing had happened. And 
that it fails to do. Failing to withdraw might be out of line with the nature of the friendship. But 
DV,VDLGDERYH6FDQORQGRHVQ¶WH[plain what reason this gives a person to withdraw (except that 
 8 
LWLVLQDGYLVDEOHXQZLVHSRLQWOHVVDZDVWHRIWLPHHWFQRWWR6FDQORQ¶VYLHZWKHQIDLOVWR
give us a satisfying account of the strength and nature of our reasons for withdrawal.10 
Secondly, as Scanlon himself notes, there are problems applying this model to the default moral 
relationship. In the case of friendship, it might ± the criticisms of the last paragraph 
notwithstanding ± be plausibly argued that the viable existence of the relationship is conditional 
on a person being in some way fit for it, where fitness will involve certain commitments to 
respecting and sustaining the terms of the relationship. Even if disqualification is not called for, 
there are degrees of friendship, degrees that are determined by some sense of the extent to which 
the parties are committed to one another. Given this, Scanlon can argue that the existence or 
degree of the relationship depends on the extent of the commitment. If we apply this model to the 
default moral relationship, we get the claim that what is owed to the person as a member of the 
relationship is similarly conditional on the degree of their commitment to it, and that there can be 
degrees of what is owed in the way of basic moral respect. As we have seen, Scanlon denies this 
conclusion, and argues that all that can change is our morally good but not required willingness 
WR³JRWKHH[WUDPLOH´IRUVRPHRQH+RZHYHUKLVDQDORJ\EHWZHHQEODPHLQIULHQGVKLSDQG
blame in the moral relationship would seem to suggest that, when someone has done a serious 
moral wrong, something counts in favour of making their inclusion in the default moral 
relationship ± and hence basic moral respect ± UHIOHFWWKHOHYHORIWKHSHUVRQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR
moral ends, even though some other prohibition (the one that makes Scanlon unwilling to make 
basic respect conditional) makes it impermissible to do so.  But this seems uncomfortable: on 
6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQWZe end up, in offering wrongdoers basic moral respect, treating people as if 
they were fit to participate in the default moral relationship even though they are not.   
Thirdly, a consequence of this second problem is that, in his account of blame in the moral 
relationship, Scanlon loses the ability to claim that his account respects the intuition that the 
GHJUHHRIEODPHVKRXOGEHSURSRUWLRQDOWRWKHVHULRXVQHVVRIWKHZURQJ6FDQORQ¶VIULHQGVKLS
H[DPSOHDSSHDOVWRDVWURQJLQWXLWLRQWKDWRQHVKRXOGGURSRUDWOHDVWUHYLVHRQH¶VUHODWLRQVKLS
with the offender. But to what extent should the relationship be revised? The proportionality 
intuition that I am interested in is that the revisions one is prepared to make in the relationship 
UHIOHFWRQH¶VYLHZRIWKHVHULRXVQHVVRIWKHZURQJ/HWXVDGDSW6FDQORQ¶VH[DPSOHDQGLPDJLQH
that a third close (mutual) friend ± call her Jerry ± was also present at the event and, although she 
did not join in with Joe, neither did she act as though what Joe had done to you should in any 
way affect her relationship with him. She protested a little, perhaps, but not to any great degree: 
she is still seeing Joe socially as a friend and has not dissociated with him to the extent that you 
think is necessary to the case. You remonstrate with her about her continued relationship, telling 
                                                     
10
 My argument here assumes that Scanlon does indeed seek to account for our reasons for withdrawal. Theoretically 
he could claim that he only seeks to account for our reasons to thinking that wrongdoing impairs the relationship. 
BuWWKHVHFWLRQRQ³7KH(WKLFVRI%ODPH´VXJJHVWVWKDW6FDQORQGRHVWKLQNWKDWDGLVSRVLWLRQWREODPHDQG
ZLWKGUDZDOLVFRQVWLWXWLYHRIWDNLQJDUHODWLRQVKLSVHULRXVO\HJ³WKHFRPSOHWHUHMHFWLRQRIEODPHZRXOGUXOHRXW
LPSRUWDQWUHODWLRQVZLWKRWKHUV´S 168). My concern LVWKDWKLVGHVHUWWKHRU\GRHVQ¶WJLYHDJRRGH[SODQDWLRQRI
that claim. 
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her you feel undermined by her, and that it puts your own friendship in doubt. Whether that 
accusation would be right or wrong in this particular case, these are conversations that we often 
have, and they reflect our interest in proportionality of response. Scanlon can capture 
proportionality in a manner of speaking when he concentrates on the case of friendship. Here his 
desert theory would suggest that the revisions in the relationship should reflect, not necessarily 
the seriousness of the wrong, but the extent to which the wrong shows that the person is not fit 
IRUWKHUHODWLRQVKLS2QHVKRXOGGRZQJUDGHRQH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSVRWKDWLWUHIOHFWVWKHGHJUHHRIWKH
RWKHU¶VFRPPLWPHQW3HUKDSVWKLVYLHZFRXOGWKHQJLYHXVDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIZKDWLVJRLQJRQ
when we criticise one another for departures from proportionality. Too little and one could be 
criticised for underestimating the extent to which the wrong manifested a lack of the 
commitment necessary for the relationship; too much and one is overestimating. However, as we 
have seen, the ability to downgrade the terms of the relationship to reflect the level of the 
ZURQJGRHU¶VFRPPLWPHQWLVORVWZKHQZHPRYHIURPIULHQGVKLSWRWKHPRUDOFRPPXQLW\,W¶V
perhaps a hoary example, but there does seem something a bit strange in the view that the blame 
we could express towards murderers and rapists would simply take the form of not trusting them, 
not helping them, and not hoping things go well for them.11 
Furthermore, this is a serious problem because proportionality between the manner in which the 
offender is treated and the seriousness of the wrong (or the extent to which the wrong shows a 
lack of commitment) is essential to the credibility of blame as an expression of disapproval. At 
least, that is the thinking that would seem to uQGHUSLQFULWLFLVPRIRQH¶VIULHQGIRUQRWEODPLQJ
Joe enough. Because she does not blame enough, she does not disapprove enough: she is treating 
it lightly, as though it were consistent with the terms of the friendship to act in that way. None of 
this makes sense unless we think of blame as an expression of disapproval, an expression that is 
called for when one is in relations with the wrongdoer, and where the degree of the blame (or 
withdrawal) should reflect the seriousness of the wrong.  
Could Scanlon deny that blame is an expression of disapproval? In fact, I think this is perhaps 
the position he should, in consistency, take. However, this leads on to the fourth and most 
fundamental problem: that the view of blame as an expression of disapproval, which his desert 
theory fails to capture, is a natural and compelling way to think about blame. Blame, on 
6FDQORQ¶VYLHZLVVLPSO\WKHUHRULHQWDWLRQRIDUHODWLRQVKLSVRWKDWLWEHWWHUPDWFKHVWKHOHYHORI
commitment that the person brings to that relationship. But nowhere does he canvass the natural 
and simple idea that the justification of blame lies in the need to disapprove of wrongdoing. 
However, this means that Scanlon also cannot accommodate the natural thought that to blame 
someone is to hold them accountable to the standards that they violated. For Scanlon, the person 
who blames does not assert the authority of the violated standards but rather downgrades the 
standards to which she thinks it appropriate for the person to be held. In some ways this sounds 
more like a judgement of contempt rather than blame. Blame pays the offender the compliment 
                                                     
11
 Of course, this is not to deny that other actions may be taken against murderers and rapists, such as strong verbal 
criticism, legal sanction (where this is not seen as an institutionalised form of blame), etc. 
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of asserting that the more demanding standards of the higher form of cooperative relationship are 
still appropriate: an account of blame should explain the sense in which it is inclusive where 
contempt is exclusive.12 
5. Disapproval and the symbolism of blame 
7KHSUREOHPVZLWK6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQWSRLQWXVWRZDUGVDPRUHDGHTXDWHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIEODPH
Like his view, this more adequate account sees blame as a kind of withdrawal or distancing that 
occurs in the context of a relationship when the terms of that relationship have been violated. But 
on this view the distancing is rather experienced as a necessary part of taking wrongdoing 
seriously and disapproving of it. On this view, it is in order to do justice to the significance of 
some wrong that we must partially suspend the attitudes of goodwill, respect and concern that 
would normally be owed to a person with whom we are in that relationship, and we must do so in 
a manner proportionate to the seriousness of the wrong. Grading judgement is unsatisfactory 
because it is inadequate to the seriousness of the wrong: the special force of blame ± including 
the withdrawal of goodwill ± is needed to reflect the seriousness of the situation. This way of 
justifying blame can be called expressive since it appeals to the idea that withdrawal from the 
offender is the necessary and appropriate vehicle of condemnation, and that without this vehicle 
the condemnation lacks meaning and hence fails adequately to distance the condemner from the 
wrong. 
If blame expresses disapproval, and blame consists in partial and temporary withdrawal from a 
relationship one has with the offender, then there is an obvious sense in which, as Scanlon wants 
to say, the wrong impairs the relationship one can have with the person. However, rather than the 
³FDQQRW´EHLQJSUXGHQWLDORUDGYLVRU\RUWRGRZLWKDSHUVRQ¶V³ILWQHVV´IRUWKHUHODWLRQVKLSLWLV
QRZDGLVWLQFWLYHO\HWKLFDO³FDQQRW´2QHFDQQRWFRQWLQXHthe relationship with the person as 
before except by failing to express appropriate disapproval of his action. But failing to express 
disapproval of the action means condoning it, or acquiescing in it, perhaps even becoming 
complicit in it. That is what you might feel towards your friend: that in continuing to have a 
normal relationship with Joe she has associated herself with what he did, become part of it, taken 
his side against you. Therefore, on this view, taking the demands of the relationship seriously 
and disapproving of what was done requires that one do not continue the relationship as before: 
VRPHVRUWRIZLWKGUDZDORUEODPHLVUHTXLUHGDVZKDW)HLQEHUJFDOOV³V\PEROLF
QRQDFTXLHVFHQFH´ 13 In the face of wrongdoing, one must not simply avow that it is wrong; one 
must distance oneself from it. Hence the act impairs the relationship that it is possible, consistent 
with proper respect for the demands of the relationship, to have with the person.  
&RQWUDU\WR)HLQEHUJ¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKHV\PEROLVPRISXQLVhment, though, we cannot see the 
symbolism of blame as merely conventional. In order to explain this point, we can look again at 
                                                     
12
 7KHIDLOXUHWRFDSWXUHWKHVHQVHRIVXSHULRULW\LQKHUHQWLQFRQWHPSWLVDSUREOHPZLWK0LFKHOOH0DVRQ¶VDWWHPSWHG
GHIHQFHRIWKLVUHDFWLRQ³&RQWHPSWDVD0RUDO$WWLWXGH´Ethics 113 (2003), pp. 234-272. 
13
 J)HLQEHUJ³7KH([SUHVVLYH)XQFWLRQRI3XQLVKPHQW´LQDoing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1974), pp. 95-118. 
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KRZWKLVYLHZRIWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIZLWKGUDZDOGLIIHUVIURP6FDQORQ¶V2Q6FDQORQ¶VYLHZDV
we have seen, withdrawal is appropriate because or insofar as the offender has shown himself to 
be unfit for the relationship. On the view I am now proposing, however, withdrawal is 
appropriate precisely because the offender is fit for the relationship. Withdrawal is called for in 
order tRFDSWXUHWKH³:KDWGLG\RXWKLQN\RXZHUHGRLQJ"´± since this is someone who should 
have known better. Blame is a partial and temporary withdrawal from an offender, a) carried out 
because of responsible wrongdoing, and b) carried out in a way that the offender herself can be 
expected to understand. Because of a) and b), blame is a way of treating the offender as a moral 
agent. It asserts the authority of the violated norms over the offending agent, holds the offender 
accountable to those norms, and in doing so includes the wrongdoer in the moral community. 
Therefore in blaming we include by partially excluding. That this is what we do, however, seems 
QRDFFLGHQWLWLVEHKDYLRXUWKDWLVVHQVLWLYHWRWKHRIIHQGHU¶VPRUDOSRVLWLRQDQGWKHQHHGWRILQG
a form of behaviour towards the offender that is adequate to that position. This is the way we 
need to treat the offender because the offender is a competent member of our moral community, 
a community defined by an understanding of what we owe to one another on the basis of the 
relationship we are in together, but who has violated the basic terms of that understanding. 
Understood in this way, the appropriateness of the symbolism is not simply conventional (at least 
if we mean by that that it is an intrinsically arbitrary marker that has its place because of a 
mutual agreement to use it in a certain way), but has rather to do with the fittingness of the action 
to the situation. In blaming we give display our understanding of how to translate the 
significance of the situation of wrongdoing into action.  
What is true in the claim that such behaviour is conventional is the Fregean thought that, as with 
any individual proposition, any piece of symbolic behaviour can only symbolise by virtue of its 
place in a wider language that contains myriad other expressive possibilities. Unlike the mystical 
FODLPWKDWWKHUHDUHKLGGHQ³FRUUHVSRQGHQFHV´WKDWH[LVWEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWREMHFWVWKHH[LVWHQFH
of which is prior to forms of human understanding being brought to bear, symbolic relations of 
the sort I am interested in cannot be thought to exist independently of the human ability to trace 
connections, similarities, resonances. But this lack of strict mind-independence need not be 
thought to undermine the thought that these resonances, once noticed, can be compelling. 
On the view I am proposing, we might say, the right way to account for the special force of 
blame is in terms of its expressive power. Talking of expressive power makes it clear that the 
notion of expression that we are interested in is not merely the notion of an instinctual expression 
of the emotions. It is not simply that the expression is forced out by some inner emotional force. 
If there is a connection between emotion and expression in the sense I am using it, it is rather that 
the expression gives form to the emotion, or rather gives form to the sense of salience or 
significance that constitutes the way in which the person experiencing the emotion construes the 
situation. Just as expression, in my sense, is not instinctive, so it is not a contingently appropriate 
means to a further end: we should not confuse expression, either with the actions one might 
FKRRVHDVDQHIIHFWLYHZD\RIYHQWLQJRQH¶VIHHOLQJVRUWKHDFWLRQVRQHPLJKWFKRRVHDVDQ
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effective way of comPXQLFDWLQJRQH¶VIHHOLQJVWRRWKHUV/LNHILQGLQJDQHIIHFWLYHPHDQVRI
reducing psychological pressure or of communicating, finding the right form of expression is like 
solving a problem. But deliberating about the latter is essentially backward-looking ± it has to do 
with finding a proportionate response to some past event that conditions the situation one is now 
in ± whereas deliberating about the former requires an empirical investigation into how to 
produce some future good state of affairs. It is in order to distinguish the sense of expression I 
am interested in from these other interpretations that I have stressed the symbolic element of 
expressive action. The idea is that expressive action purports to be a symbol of the situation, 
where a symbol is not merely a conventional way of denoting something other than itself but is 
rather a meaningful item that bears a more intimate relationship to the thing signified: successful 
symbolic action is like a successful metaphor, capturing that aspect of the thing signified that is 
most relevant in the context. 
Clearly blaming is not the only such symbolic action. Other examples include acts of symbolic 
nonacquiescence such as civil disobedience, the act of marriage, expressions of gratitude, acts of 
grieving and mourning. Perhaps not surprisingly, it is often when we are confronted by important 
passages from one place or state or situation to another that we reach for symbolism in an 
attempt to capture the importance of what we think we are going through.14 And in all of these 
cases, an important parameter of appropriateness will be the proportionality of the response to 
the significance of the occasion. In the case of mourning, for instance, where one has lost a loved 
one, one might search for a way of capturing onH¶VVHQVHRIWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHORVVRQH
PLJKWIHHOWKDWZRUGVDUHQRWHQRXJKDQGWKDWDFHUWDLQZD\RIWUHDWLQJWKHSHUVRQ¶VERG\LVQRZ
important, before that opportunity is irrevocably lost. Something like that thought might be the 
driving force behind the various forms of funerary rites that we find resonant. As with blame, 
there are various equally valid ways of carrying that basic impulse through; but the impulse 
LWVHOIDQGWKHEDVLFIRUPRILWVV\PEROLVPGRHVQ¶WVHHPPHUHO\FRQYHQWLRQDO 
To sum up the thesis for which I have argued in this section, blame is an expression of 
GLVDSSURYDOLWZRUNVLQV\PEROLFWHUPVDWWHPSWLQJWRFDSWXUHRUGRMXVWLFHWRWKHRIIHQGHU¶V
moral position as a member of a relationship who has violated the basic terms of that 
relationship. In more general terms, I have claimed that some acts are essentially symbolic in that 
they work a bit like metaphors, capturing and illuminating some aspect of the situation. The form 
of the behaviour is not conventional or arbitrary, but rather has an essential role in making the 
action adequate to the situation. Like a metaphor, sometimes symbolic action can seem to get the 
situation just right (as when, after much deliberation, one alights on just the right way to express 
RQH¶VJratitude for the help one has been given). Thus sometimes the symbolism of the action is 
compelling. Otherwise put, sometimes it is the symbolism of the action that provides the reason 
to do the action. Therefore, a consequence of what I have argued here is that, in order to give a 
                                                     
14
 For an account of ritual action that draws on this point about passage from one state to another, see R. A. 
Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
However, I do not intend the thesis here to apply only to ritual or ceremonial action. 
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comprehensive theoretical account of our best understanding of morally adequate response, we 
need to recognise a category of essentially expressive, symbolic reasons, reasons for action the 
force of which has to do with the way in which those actions symbolically capture or do justice 
to the significance of situation.  
6FDQORQRQDIILUPLQJYLFWLPVDQG³V\PEROLFYDOXH´ 
+DYLQJORRNHGDWVRPHSUREOHPVLQ6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQW,KDYHDUJXHGWKDWDPRUHSODXVLEOH
theory of blame would see it as an expression of disapproval without which agents relevantly 
connected to the offence would be condoning or acquiescing in the offence. In order to justify 
blame we would have to argue that the symbolism of blame ± specifically the enactment of a 
kind of distancing or withdrawal ± is necessary to bring this nonacquiescence about. In this 
section I would like to point out that a number of the elements of this theory are to be found in 
RWKHUDVSHFWVRI6FDQORQ¶VZRUN,ZLOODUJXHWKDW6FDQORQKDVWhe resources to accept a) that 
essentially symbolic acts are necessary to bring about non-acquiescence in an offence, though he 
rejects b) that withdrawal is the necessary symbolism. However, c) he recognises that blame 
essentially involves withdrawal, and therefore d) attempts to account for such withdrawal in a 
different way. In response I want to argue that d) fails and that b) is unnecessary. 
In his reflections on punishment, Scanlon is sensitive to the point that I have claimed is central to 
understanding blame, namely, the importance of affirming the claims of the victims of 
wrongdoing.15 +HDUJXHVWKDW³WKHH[SUHVVLRQRIFRQGHPQDWLRQVHHPVWREHLPSRUWDQWO\
connected with punishment ... The central function of criminal law is to protect rights whose 
violation makes condemnation appropriate. So punishment will not be justifiable except where 
FRQGHPQDWLRQDQGKHQFHWKHDIILUPDWLRQRIYLFWLPV¶ULJKWVLVDSSURSULDWHDQGjust punishment 
will constitute such affirmation´16 In this aspect of his position, Scanlon seems to accept that a 
IDLOXUHWRPDUNWKHYLRODWLRQRIULJKWVDVVXFKZRXOGUHIOHFW³LQGLIIHUHQFHRQWKHSDUWRIVRFLHW\
WRZDUGVWKHZURQJVDQGWKRVHZKRVXIIHUHGWKHP´DQGWKDW³WKHYLFWLPVRIVXFKZURQJVDUH
demeaned when the victimizers are treaWHGDVUHVSHFWHGFLWL]HQVZLWKQRPHQWLRQRIWKHLUFULPHV´
(p. 223). Another way of putting this point, which Scanlon makes use of, is to say that violations 
of rights must be given proper recognition. However, to see that this commits Scanlon to 
something in the way of what I have called the expressive, consider that there are two things that 
PLJKWEHPHDQWE\³UHFRJQLWLRQ´DQGKHQFHE\WKHFODLPWKDWDIDLOXUHWRHQJDJHLQFHUWDLQDFWV
of affirmation shows lack of recognition. One is that recognition consists in cognitive 
DSSUHFLDWLRQRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ,IZHWKLQNRIUHFRJQLWLRQLQWKLVZD\WKHQ6FDQORQ¶VFODLPLV
false: it is not true that a failure to engage in acts of affirmation necessarily shows either a failure 
to understand the gravity of the act or indifference to it. Someone might care deeply that a 
SHUVRQ¶VULJKWVKDYHEHHQYLRODWHGEXWWKLQNWKDWWKHDSSURSULDWHUHVSRQVHLVVLPSO\GRLQJZKDW
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 706FDQORQ³3XQLVKPHQWDQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ´LQThe Difficulty of Tolerance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 219-233. 
16
 ³3XQLVKPHQWDQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ´pp. 231-2 (my italics). Note that Scanlon complicates this position by arguing 
that the need for affirmation, though it will justify having some public forum for the recognition of violated rights, 
will not itself justify punishment.  
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one can to prevent such things happening again. Such a person would be unusual, but not 
inconsistent. HowHYHUDQRWKHUWKLQJWKDWPLJKWEHPHDQWE\WKHQHHGIRU³UHFRJQLWLRQ´LVWKDW
WKHYLRODWLRQRIYLFWLP¶VULJKWVPXVWEHUHIOHFWHGLQRQH¶VRZQEHKDYLRXULQWKHVHQVHWKDWDQ
HVVHQWLDOO\V\PEROLFDIILUPDWLRQLVFDOOHGIRU2QWKLVUHDGLQJRI³UHFRJQLWLRQ´I have argued, 
6FDQORQ¶VFODLPLVWUXHDIDLOXUHWRHQJDJHLQV\PEROLFDIILUPDWLRQLVDIDLOXUHWRGLVVRFLDWHIURP
WKHZURQJDQGKHQFHUHSUHVHQWVFXOSDEOHLQGLIIHUHQFH7KHUHIRUHWKLVDVSHFWRI6FDQORQ¶V
position should be understood as committing him to the necessity of something in the way of 
HVVHQWLDOO\V\PEROLFXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRI³DIILUPDWLRQ´³UHFRJQLWLRQ´DQG³LQGLIIHUHQFH´ 
That Scanlon can accept the importance of the expressive is also suggested by his inclusion of 
³V\PEROLFYDOXH´LQWKHGLVFXVVion of the value of choice:  
³,QDVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFKSHRSOHDUHQRUPDOO\H[SHFWHGWRPDNHFKRLFHVRIDFHUWDLQVRUW
for themselves, individuals have reason to value the opportunity to make these choices 
because not having or not exercising this opportunity would be seen as reflecting a 
MXGJHPHQWWKHLURZQRUVRPHRQHHOVH¶VWKDWWKH\DUHQRWFRPSHWHQWRUGRQRWKDYHWKH
VWDQGLQJQRUPDOO\DFFRUGHGDQDGXOWPHPEHURIWKHVRFLHW\´17 
For instance, he suggests that, in a society in which arranged marriages are not the norm, having 
RQH¶VSDUHQWVPDNHWKHFKRLFHRIPDUULDJHSDUWQHUZRXOGEH³GHPHDQLQJ´RQWKHJURXQGVWKDWLW
ZRXOG³VXJJHVWWKDWWKH\DUHQRWFRPSHWHQWLQGHSHQGHQWDGXOWV´18 Thus we could interpret his 
claims about condemnation on these lines: that in a society in which certain acts are normally 
understood as expressing condemnation for an act, failure to engage in those acts will symbolise 
indifference. Admittedly, these brief remarks on symbolic value could be interpreted in two 
ways. First of all, as I suggest, they might be read as committing Scanlon to the claim that some 
actions have an essentially expressive or symbolic aspect, and that a failure to engage in 
symbolically adequate acts can be in itself wrong. Or, secondly, they could be given a more 
deflationary reading: that what is wrong with engaging in behaviour that has a certain symbolic 
value is that, given a certain audience, one thereby conveys the impression that one has certain 
EHOLHIVDERXWWKHSHUVRQ¶VYDOXHRUVWDQGLQJDQGJLYLQJ that impression can have bad 
consequences, say). My reasons for thinking that Scanlon is committed to the first reading is that 
he does not simply say that, in a given context, depriving a person of certain choices gives the 
impression that the agent views the person as lacking competence or independence; rather, in this 
case and the case of failure to condemn, he says these actions are demeaning. As I have 
explained, this understanding of demeaning requires some awareness of the symbolic adequacy 
of our actions. 
Hence I think that Scanlon has the resources to accept my claim that what makes an act 
obligatory can be its symbolism (and that this symbolic relation does not reduce to a more 
fundamental claim about bad consequences). However, what Scanlon is prepared to say about 
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 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 253. 
18
 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 253. 
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state condemnation of wrongdoing raises the question why he does not see blame similarly as a 
symbolic expression of disapproval and nonacquiescence. I think the reason for this may be that 
Scanlon is persuaded that some sort of withdrawal or impairment of relationships is essential to 
blame, but is also convinced that condemnation does not need the symbolism of withdrawal in 
order to be adequate to the gravity of the wrong. Therefore he cannot make the move I make, 
using symbolism to explain the meaning of withdrawal. As a result, he develops his distinctive 
desert theory. As we have seen, the cost of this development is that he gives up the natural 
thought that blame is essentially an expression of disapproval, a holding to account. Hence my 
claim that the stronger account of blame will be one on which the blamer sees withdrawal 
precisely as the necessary vehicle for the expression of disapproval.  
7KHUHIRUHWKHKHDUWRIWKHPDWWHUSHUKDSVQRWVXUSULVLQJO\WXUQVRQ6FDQORQ¶VUHMHFWLRQof 
retributivism. For I think it is this that leads him to deny that withdrawal is necessary for 
symbolically adequate condemnation.19 However, I would like to conclude by suggesting that 
Scanlon could accept the claim I have advanced in this paper about the symbolism of withdrawal 
without committing himself to what is objectionable in retributivism. What leads Scanlon to 
reject retributivism would seem to be the thought that retributivism consists in what he calls the 
'HVHUW7KHVLV³WKDWZKHQDSHUVRQKDVdone something that is morally wrong it is morally better 
WKDWKHRUVKHVKRXOGVXIIHUVRPHORVVLQFRQVHTXHQFH´20 However, if my account of blame is 
UHWULEXWLYLVWWKHQZKDWLWMXVWLILHVLVQRWWKHLQIOLFWLRQRIVXIIHULQJRUWKHYDOXLQJRIWKDWSHUVRQ¶V
suffering or harm as such, but rather a kind of cutting off or distancing. Such withdrawal may 
itself cause suffering; furthermore, it may turn out that such withdrawal may make it permissible 
to cause or allow certain harms to a person that would not otherwise have been permissible.21 
But these further harms are not essential to the nature of blame (except insofar as blame can be 
characterised as a willingness to let such things happen). Blame can successfully be carried out 
without such suffering occurring (except, perhaps, the pain of remorse). Does the symbolic view 
FRPPLWPHWRWKHZRUULVRPHYLHZWKDW³ZKHQSHRSOH¶VPRUDOGHILFLHQFLHVDUHJUHDWWKHSURSHU
response on our part is to see even their most basic moral claims on the rest of us as limited and 
quDOLILHG´S"1RWQHFHVVDULO\,WGHSHQGVZKDWGHJUHHRIZLWKGUDZDOLVSURSRUWLRQDWHWR
wrongs of such seriousness. Proportionality, it is fair to say, is not well understood in desert 
WKHRULHVRISXQLVKPHQWDQGEODPH,GRQ¶WKDYHDJHQHUDOWKHRU\WR offer; nor am I sure that one 
could be given (though it seems also fair to say that the possibility of social interaction requires 
that there be some shared basis for judging which claims about proportionate response are 
reasonable and which not). But one crucial thing to be taken into account in any judgement about 
                                                     
19
 It also leads him to deny that punishment is necessary for state condemnation of wrongdoing ± though this makes 
it harder to interpret his claim that when punishment is carried out it could constitute such condemnation. See 
³3XQLVKPHQWDQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ´ 
20
 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 274. 
21
 ,WLVQRWFOHDUWKDW6FDQORQ¶VRZQSRVLWLRQRQSXQLVKPHQWLV coherent unless he accepts the same. His claim is that 
WKRVHZKRGHVHUYHFRQGHPQDWLRQFDQEHSXQLVKHGIRUGHWHUUHQWSXUSRVHV+RZHYHUKHSUHVXPDEO\GRHVQ¶WWKLQNWKDW
the innocent can be punished when doing so would be necessary for some important deterrent effect. Therefore 
Scanlon seems committed to the thought that being condemnation-worthy makes it permissible to cause you harms 
WKDWZRXOGQRWRWKHUZLVHKDYHEHHQSHUPLVVLEOH6HH³3XQLVKPHQWDQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ´ 
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proportionate blame and withdrawal is the point I made earlier in criticism of Scanlon: that the 
right theory of blame should be able to account for the fact that blame is inclusive as well as 
exclusive. We withdraw from the offender precisely because she is that extraordinary and 
valuable thing, an agent capable of self-JRYHUQPHQW7KHRIIHQGHU¶VPRUDOVWDWXVDVDQDJHQWZLWK
whom we could potentially engage in distinctively human, rational, ethical interaction should be 
to the fore whenever we blame, as a factor informing our judgements about what blaming 
response is proportionate. A plausible implication of this is that blaming judgements do not 
require us to neglect the basic human needs even of very serious wrongdoers. At the same time, 
on this theory of blame, we might also be able to explain that sense of discomfort, even horror, 
that is sometimes reported by those who find themselves in the presence of evil. 
7. Conclusion 
I have defended two main claims in this paper. The first is that the most promising way to 
understand ± and, if appropriate, to justify ± the special force of blame, is to see blame as 
embodying the view that, in order for a response to (serious) wrongdoing to be adequate to the 
significance of those wrongs, one must not simply say or judge that the action is wrong but must 
distance oneself from it. Such distancing, through withdrawal of goodwill, is what blame consists 
in. The second claim says that the best way to understand the first thesis is to see it as appealing 
persuasively to some kind of symbolic necessity, that is, to the fact that what makes it the case 
that one must distance oneself from wrongdoing is that such including-but-distancing behaviour 
captures or reflHFWVWKHRIIHQGHU¶VPRUDOVLWXDWLRQDQGWKDWWKHIDFWWKDWVXFKEHKDYLRXUFDSWXUHV
WKHRIIHQGHU¶VPRUDOSRVLWLRQPDNHVLWZURQJIXODFTXLHVFHQFHRUFRPSOLFLW\WRFRQWLQXHWKH
relationship as normal. I imagine that objections to my argument will either, as on the view I 
ascribed to Scanlon in the preceding section, accept my wider claims that the symbolism of an 
action is sometimes the ground of our reason to do that action, but dispute my claim that blame 
and withdrawal are necessary in order to do justice to the wrongs; or reject the idea that symbolic 
relations can be the ground of moral reasons at all. 
I admit that the topic of the normativity of expressive action bears a good deal of further 
research; no doubt further argument is required to make it persuasive to many readers. On the 
other hand, the position for which I have argued has been, if not well-understood, at least 
reasonably familiar, in Anglo-American moral and legal philosophy since Feinberg and the Hart-
Devlin debate, though it has its roots LQWKH5RPDQWLFUHDFWLRQWRWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQWLQ+HJHO¶V
WKHRU\RIDFWLRQDQGLQ%DXGHODLUH¶V6\PEROLVP,WLVSHUKDSVPRUHRIWHQIRXQGLQDHVWKHWLFV
than in moral philosophy, but that seems to me a mistake. In neglecting the expressive, symbolic 
aspects of action, or treating them as at best conventional, and at worst dangerously irrational, 
moral philosophy deprives itself of one of our basic modes of responding to moral significance.22 
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